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Abstract 
 
GPRS offers the user an “always on” connection to Internet and Intranet. Some of 
the services may require high level of security. This can be financial transaction 
over the Internet, or exchange of confidential documents from a company’s 
Intranet to an employee. It is important to have strong focus on the security, so 
companies and persons that demand high level of security can take advantage of 
the services GPRS offered. What normally happens is that the services wins 
against the security. This is in most cases adequate security for what a normal 
subscriber requires. 
 
This thesis covers which security functions that exists in GPRS, the threats it 
meets, how to avoid attacks, and the consequences for the attacked part. The 
thesis is also meant for the Ericsson AS’ employees as a supplement to their 
knowledge about GPRS security issues. 
 
The GPRS has inherited most of the security threats that exists in the GSM 
system. In addition the GPRS encounter new and bigger challenges. This since 
GPRS employs IP technology and it is connected to the Internet. Threats to the 
GPRS are not only from the insecure public network, Internet. Attacks on the data 
at the air interface, or operators handling of data that are transmitted or stored in 
their network, can also be a threat.   
 
Mobile terminals and GPRS equipment are the two main areas that need to be 
protected from the GPRS point of view. This also includes protection of subscriber 
information and other information that is stored in the GPRS network. Firewalls 
and Border Gateways are used to protect the mobile terminals and the GPRS 
equipment from external network and other operators network. The placements 
of firewalls are complicated because of the different connections it has to handle, 
and what routing procedure the GPRS operator uses. This thesis treats the 
subject of placement of firewalls.  
 
During the work with the thesis we got the possibility to participate and execute 
tests on the GPRS system in order to evaluate its security. These tests were done 
at Ericsson AS’s test lab in Grimstad, and we choose to focus the test on how the 
new GPRS node in the operators network can be attacked. This thesis includes a 
description and the results from the test. 
  
The results from the test gives an indication on how difficult it is to get access to 
the GPRS node, and what possibilities an intruder has if he gets access.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
We are moving towards a society with great demands for the future. We would 
like to have the same facilities when we are travelling as we have at the office 
and at home. To meet our demands, the GPRS service has evolved from GSM to 
make high-speed data transmission possible.  
 
The GPRS system offers high data rate packet switched connections and improves 
the utilisation of the network and radio resources. Compared to the circuit 
switched radio transmission, where single users occupy a complete traffic channel 
for the entire call period, GPRS allow multiple users to share one physical 
channel. 
 
GPRS is designed to support from intermittent data transfers to occasional 
transmission of large volumes of data. It offers several quality of service profiles, 
and fast allocation of resources for packet transmission, normally 0,5 to 1 second. 
Charging is typically based on the amount of data transferred [14].  
 
One of the facilities that GPRS offers is connection to the Internet. Since the 
GPRS is using IP technology to communicate over the Internet, the GPRS systems 
meets challenges to keep a satisfying security for the subscribers and the 
operators network elements. Even at the first glance it seems to be sufficient to 
protect the GPRS system from attacks initiated from the Internet, but the GPRS 
system is much more complex and attacks to other parts of the system is also a 
realistic threat.  
 
It is important to take care of the security and protect the subscribers and the 
different network elements against intruders that want to harm or take advantage 
of the damage. 
 
This thesis is basically a theoretical study about how the security is covered, what 
threats the GPRS system meets, what are the consequences of attacks and what 
can be done to take care of the security. We have also done a test in Eriksson 
AS’s lab environment. The test is focused on the possibilities for an intruder to 
get illegal access to GPRS nodes.    
 
 
 
Security in GPRS 
 
 
8 
1.2 The Thesis definition 
Project title:  
 
Security in GPRS 
 
Purpose of the Project: 
 
The purpose of this project is to identify insecurity in the GPRS system. How can 
the weaknesses in the GPRS system be attacked and what are the consequences 
due to these intrusions? Also estimate the possibilities to avoid security attacks.  
 
Definition of the Project: 
 
This task will be closely tied up towards the development of GPRS (General 
Packet Radio Service) application ongoing at Ericsson AS in Grimstad.  
 
The subject is mainly a theoretical evaluation and the following issues will be 
outlined: 
• Literature studies of security in GPRS; what security mechanisms exists 
today and are the security functions sufficiently covered  
• What risks threatens the security in the GPRS network, how is this attacks 
accomplished and what are the consequences of this intrusion 
• What are the weaknesses with this kind of IP-networks 
• Is it possible to improve the security and how much does it cost to 
accomplish these improvements? 
1.3 Limitation of the Thesis 
Early in the project period we agreed, together with our supervisor Fryvil Cecilie 
Heggelund Lia, to drop the cost estimation on how to improve the security. This 
was done because the cost estimation itself is a large issue and it is also outside 
our course of study. 
1.4 A overview of the security in GPRS 
1.4.1 Introduction  
The GPRS is a new service that is offered to the mobile phone users. Netcom and 
Telenor, who are the two largest operators in Norway introduced GPRS on 
January 31 and February 1, 2001. So far it is just a small number of mobile 
phone on the marked that supports GPRS and it is also difficult to get hold of a 
mobile phone. The operators offer a limited numbers of services to the GPRS 
costumers. One of the services that GPRS is supporting today is the MobilMail. 
MobileMail is possible to use with the entire mobile phone that use WAP, but with 
the GPRS functionality “always on” the email service MobileMail is more attractive 
[27].    
 
It is important that the security is taken care of. This is because the users; both 
private persons and companies, can feel safe and use the services that the 
operators offer. Services that demand a high level of security could be financial 
transactions, transfer of medical information or exchange of personal e-mail 
messages. 
 
In the next two subchapters we have explained which part in the GPRS system 
we are focusing on and the test we did in the Ericsson AS’s lab environment. 
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1.4.2 Security issues in GPRS  
 
GGSNSGSN 
GPRS 
backbon
Other Network 
 
Internet 
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4
5
Mobile phone 
and  
SIM card 
1 
 
Figure 1.1 The security issues in GPRS 
 
From the figure there are five main areas where security in the GPRS system is 
exposed. These five areas are: 
 
1. Security aspect related to the mobile phone and the SIM card.  
 
2. Security mechanics between the MS and the SGSN. These include also 
the air interface from the MS to the BSS. 
 
3. The PLMNs backbone network security that mainly referred to the traffic 
between the SGSN and the GGSN. But also handling the flow of 
subscriber information, like triplets between the HLR and SGSN. 
 
4. Security between different operators. 
 
5. Security between GGSN and the external connected networks, like 
Internet.  
 
1.4.3 Testing the security of the CGSN 
This Thesis also includes a description of a test done at the Ericsson security lab 
in Grimstad. It will describe how to reveal weaknesses that can lead to a security 
breach in the GPRS system. Included is also a part with a general overview of 
how an intruder usually will prepare a system attack by taking advantage of the 
weak points.   
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1.5 Method and report outline 
In the beginning of our thesis we participated in a two day GPRS course. This 
course was held by Ericsson. The “Introduction” chapter about GPRS is basically 
based on the information and documentation from that course.  
 
In this report there are many references to different European Telecommunication 
Standards Institute - ETSI documents. These documents often include a large 
amount of information. The information that was essential to the security issues 
in GPRS was located in many different documents. This document is focused on 
gathering the different security aspects in GPRS and give a more uniform 
description. The two main chapters; “Security functions in GPRS” and “Security 
threats to the GPRS” are where we have used the ETSI documents most. 
 
From the Internal Ericsson document, “Ericsson GPRS Security Solutions” we got 
some good ideas to the “Protecting the different GPRS parts” chapter.  
 
When using the Ericsson test lab, we used Ericsson’s descriptions of how to 
execute system tests. We used some of this documentation when describing the 
test, but we also used information from the Nessus homepage about the Nessus 
tool.  
 
Especially in the beginning of the project period we searched for information 
related to our thesis on newsgroups, Internet and Ericsson’s Intranet. The 
information was limited, but we discovered some information we could use to get 
an overview of hackers interest and knowledge on GPRS. There were also 
assignments, done by students at Helsinki University, which covered some of our 
theoretical part of the thesis. 
 
We have chosen to build our thesis on the five issues described in chapter 1.4.2. 
The test part is also explained with concern on these issues. The chapter “How to 
protect the different GPRS parts” is not according to this structure. In this chapter 
we have mainly chosen to focus on how IP networks and IP traffic in the GPRS 
system can be protected by firewalls, Virtual Private Networks and the IP security 
protocol IPSec.    
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2 GPRS overview 
2.1 An introduction to the GPRS 
The GPRS is a GSM phase 2+ service and is also an essential first step towards 
third generation mobile network (UMTS). The standardisation of GPRS started in 
1993 by the ETSI (European Telecommunication Standards Institute)[8].  
 
2.2 The GPRS System 
The Figure 2.1 illustrates the GPRS architecture. This chapter describes the 
elements in the GPRS system. It has focused on the components that are added 
to the GSM system, but it also includes components that are already known in the 
GSM system.  
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Figure 2.1 GPRS logical architecture 
 
MS - Mobile Station  
 
Depending on the Mobile Station (MS) and the network capabilities, GPRS MSs 
can operate in three different modes: 
 
• Class A mode of operation allows an MS to have a Circuit Switched (CS) 
connection at the same time as it is involved in a packet transfer. 
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• Class B mode of operation allows an MS to be attached to both CS and 
Packet Switched (PS), but it cannot use both services at the same time. 
However, MS that is involved in a packet transfer can receive a page for 
CS traffic. The MS can then suspend the packet transfer for the duration of 
the CS connection and afterwards resume the packet transfer. 
 
•  Class C mode of operation allows a MS only to be attached to one service 
at the time. A MS that only supports GPRS and not CS traffic will always 
work in class C mode of operation. 
 
The combination of a Terminal Equipment (TE) and Mobile Terminal (MT) is a MS, 
but TE and MT components could actually be in the same piece of equipment. 
From the TE point of view e.g. a laptop computer, you could compare the MT to a 
modem, connecting the laptop computer to the GPRS system. 
 
The MT is associated with a subscriber in the GPRS system. The MT establishes a 
link to a SGSN. Channel reselection is provided at the radio link between the MT 
and the SGSN. The IP connection is static from the TE point of view; that is, the 
TE does not know it is mobile and retains its assigned IP address until the MT 
detaches. 
 
BSS – Base Station System 
 
The Base Station System (BSS) consists of a Base Station Controller (BSC) and a 
Base Transceiver Station (BTS). 
 
The BTS is the radio equipment that transmits and receives information over the 
air to let the BSC communicate with MSs in the BSC’s service area. A group of 
BTSs is controlled by a BSC. The BTS must contain GPRS-specific software. 
 
HLR – Home Location Register 
 
The Home Location Register (HLR) is the database that holds subscription 
information for every person who has bought a subscription from the GPRS 
operator. Information found in the HLR includes, for example, supplementary 
services, authentication parameters, Access Point Name (APN) such as the 
subscribers Internet Service Provider (ISP), and whether a static IP address is 
allocated to the MS. In addition, the HLR includes information about the location 
of the MS. For GPRS, subscribers information is exchanged between HLR and 
SGSN. Note that the authentication triplets are retrieved directly from the HLR to 
the SGSN. 
 
VLR – Visitor Location Register 
 
The Visitor Location Register (VLR) database contains information about all MSs 
that are currently located in the SGSN routing area.  
 
The VLR contains temporary subscriber information needed by the SGSN to 
provide services for visiting subscribers. 
 
SGSN – Serving GPRS Support Node 
 
The Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) is a primary component in the GSM 
network using GPRS and is a new component in GSM. The SGSN forwards 
incoming and outgoing IP packets addressed to/from a mobile station that is 
attached within the SGSN service area, and it also provides packet routing and 
transfer to and from the SGSN service area. It serves all GPRS subscribers that 
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are physically located within the geographical SGSN service area. A GPRS 
subscriber may be served by any SGSN in the network all depending on location.  
 
The SGSN also provides: 
 
• Ciphering and authentication.  
 
• Session management 
 
• Mobility management 
 
• Logical link management towards the MS 
 
 
GGSN - Gateway GPRS Support Node  
 
Like the SGSN, the Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) is a primary component 
in the GSM network using GPRS and is a new component. The GGSN provides 
 
• The interface towards the external IP packet networks. The GGSN 
therefore contains access functionality that interfaces external ISP 
functions like routers and RADIUS servers (Remote Access Dial-In User 
Service), which are used for security purposes. From the external IP 
network’s point of view, the GGSN acts as a router for the IP addresses of 
all subscribers served by the GPRS network. The GGSN thus exchanges 
routing information with the external network. 
 
• GPRS session management; communication setup towards external 
network. 
 
• Functionality for associating the subscribers to the right SGSN. 
 
• Output of billing data. The GGSN collects billing information for each MS, 
related to the external data network usage. Both the GGSN and the SGSN 
collect charging information on usage of the GPRS network resources. 
 
CGSN – Co-located GPRS Support Node 
 
Co-located GPRS Support Node (CGSN) means that the SGSN and GGSN 
functionalities are combined in the same physical node (network element), but 
they may also reside in different physical nodes. SGSN and GGSN contain GPRS 
backbone network protocol (IP) routing functionality, and they may be 
interconnected with IP routers. 
 
BG – Border Gateway 
 
SGSN and GGSN can be located in different PLMNs. The two PLMNs will then be 
connected via Border Gateways (BG) for security and interoperability reasons. 
The Border Gateways are part of the GGSNs. The BG could consist of a firewall, 
security functions, and routing functions. BGs as well as their functionality are 
selected by the GPRS operators’ mutual agreement to enable roaming. 
 
EIR – Equipment Identity Register 
 
The Equipment Identity Register (EIR) is a database containing mobile equipment 
identity information, which helps to block calls from stolen, unauthorized, or 
defective MSs. 
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AuC – Authentication Center 
 
The AuC includes information for identifying authorized users of the GPRS 
network and for preventing unauthorized use of the network. AuC is often a 
physical part of the HLR. 
 
AuC is a GSM-specified entity that provides triplets to the authentication and 
ciphering process used within GSM. The authentication for GPRS and for GSM 
subscribers is the same. The change in security for GPRS is related only to the 
new ciphering algorithm. This change does not require an update for AuC.  
  
LIN - Lawful Interception Node 
 
The LIN is used to collect information about some pre-defined subscriber or 
subscribers. The information could include, e.g., the data sent and received by 
the interception target, location information, and subscriber information. The 
lawful interception is an action based on the law, which is performed by the GPRS 
network. The GPRS network has to be able to deliver required user data and 
other network related information to the Law Enforcement Agency (LEA), 
whenever wanted.  
 
GPRS backbone networks 
 
The GPRS backbone network can be either intra- or inter-operator network. The 
main function of the intra-operator backbone network is to connect the GSNs of a 
single operator. The inter-operator backbone network connects GPRS operators 
and provides international GPRS roaming. GPRS backbone networks are IP based. 
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3 Security functions in GPRS 
3.1 Background  
This chapter is about how it is recommended to take care of the security. It is 
basically based on different ETSI documents. Before the details of the five issues, 
we have explained some keywords related to security. 
3.2 Overview 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication (CIA) are three different services that 
computer and network security should cover. All the three services have to be 
protected, an attack against one or some of them are possible. It is important to 
have strict control for who should have Access control and dispense with Denial-
of-Service for the authorized users.  
 
Confidentiality – The property of information that has not been disclosed to 
unauthorized parties[4]. Confidentiality has traditionally been seen as the most 
formidable threat in the communications system. To provide confidentiality 
encryption is used. 
 
Integrity – The property of information that  has not been changed by 
unauthorized parties [4]. Integrity is normally associated with error correction 
and retransmission techniques to ensure that data are not corrupted. 
Cryptographical checksum is a technique to ensure that data is not wilfully 
modified. 
 
Authentication – The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an 
entity[4]. Authentication is reference to the user identity verification. Challenge-
Response is a common authentication mechanism that active challenge the user 
to claim that he is the right person, so the user has to give the right response.  
 
Access control – The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the 
prevention of a resource in an unauthorized manner [4]. Access control is to give 
access to services for authorized user and denying unauthorized user the same 
services.  
 
Denial-of-Service – While access control is about denying the unauthorized user 
access to the services, Denial-of-Service can be seen as a security service to 
ensure that unauthorized users are denied access to the services [8].    
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3.3 Terminal and the SIM card 
 
The SIM-card contains the identity of the subscriber. When it is inserted into a 
Mobile Equipment (ME), they together form a Mobile Station (MS)[18]. 
 
 
MS
SIM ME
 
 
Figure 3.1 Mobile Station 
 
The primary function of the SIM in conjunction with a GPRS network is to 
authenticate an MS before it gets access to the network. The SIM contains the 
IMSI, Ki, the ciphering key generating algorithm (A8), the authentication 
algorithm (A3), as well as a Personal Identification Number (PIN)[7]. The GPRS 
A5 algorithm is implemented in the ME together with the International Mobile 
Equipment Identity (IMEI) that is physically secured in the ME. The authentication 
procedure is described more thoroughly in chapter 3.3   
 
SIM 
 
IMSI   International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
Every subscriber in the GPRS system has a unique IMSI. IMSI consist of 
three digits Mobile Country Code (MCC), two digits Mobile Networks Code 
(MNC) and 10 digits Mobile Subscriber Identity Number (MSIN) as shown 
in Figure 3.2 
 
 
IMSI
NMSI
2 digits  3 digits 
MCC MNC MSIN
Not more than 15 digits
Norway Telenor /Netcom
(242) (01)/(02)
 
            
Figure 3.2   International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
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Ki  Individual Subscriber Authentication Key. 
 The length of Ki is 128 bits. 
 
A8  The ciphering key generating algorithm. 
The A8 algorithm is using the Ki together with the 128 bits authentication 
RAND to generate the 64 bits Ciphering Key, GPRS-Kc. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3.3. 
 
 
GPRS-Kc 
A8 A8 
MS side Network side 
Ki KiRAND
GPRS-Kc 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Using A8 
 
A3 The authentication algorithm. 
Different operators have the choice to use the ETSI algorithm A3 or they 
can use an applicable A3 algorithm to their subscribers. The purpose of the 
algorithm A3 is to allow authentication of a mobile subscriber’s identity 
[1]. The algorithm A3 must compute an expected response SRES from a 
random challenge RAND sent by the network. For this calculation, 
algorithm A3 makes use of the secret authentication key Ki. The use of A3 
is shown in the Figure 3.4. 
 
 
SRES 
A3 A3 
MS side Network side 
Ki KiRAND
SRES 
Equals? 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The use of A3 algorithm 
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PIN Personal Identification Number 
PIN is an access condition to control user access to the SIM. If the 
subscriber types the PIN code incorrectly e.g. three times, the SIM will be 
blocked [12].  
 
ME 
 
GPRS–A5 
As mention earlier the GPRS-A5 algorithm is installed in the ME, to be 
totally correct the algorithm can actually reside in the ME, Terminal 
Adaptation (TA) or the Terminal Equipment (TE) from a MS point of view 
[19]. 
 
The GPRS-A5 algorithm is used for ciphering the data and signaling during 
a data transfer. The range of ciphering in GPRS is from the ciphering 
function at the SGSN to the ciphering function in the MS. The enciphering 
stream at one end, and the deciphering stream at the other end, must be 
synchronized for the enciphering bit stream and the deciphering bit 
streams to coincide. Synchronisation is guaranteed by driving Algorithm 
GPRS-A5 by an explicit variable INPUT per established LLC (Logical Link 
Control) and DIRECTION [1], this is illustrated in Figure 3.5.  
 
ciphered text 
Sending End 
output 
clear 
text 
GPRS-A5 
INPUT 
Kc 
DIRECTION 
Sending End 
output 
GPRS-A5 
INPUT 
Kc
DIRECTION 
clear
text 
 
Figure 3.5 GPRS-A5 ciphering process 
 
The equipment security relies on the integrity of the International Mobile 
Equipment Identity (IMEI)[3]. The IMEI is a 14 digit decimal number composed of 
three distinct elements [20]: 
 
- a 6 digit Type Approval Code (TAC) 
 
- a 2 digit Final Assembly Code (FAC) and 
 
- a 6 digit Serial Number (SNR). 
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A check digit complements the IMEI. The check digit is not part of the digits 
transmitted at IMEI check occasions. The Check Digit shall avoid manual 
transmission errors, e.g. when customers register stolen MSs at the operators 
customer care desk.  
 
The unique IMEI shall be securely stored in the terminals during the 
manufacturing process. The main objective is to be able to take measures against 
the use of stolen equipment or against equipment that no longer can be tolerated 
by the system for technical reasons. 
 
The Equipment Identity Register (EIR) contain a database where the IMEI are 
stored. Three registers are defined for an administrative use of the IMEI, these 
are known as white lists, grey lists and black lists. 
 
The white list is composed of all number series of equipment identities 
that are permitted for use. 
 
Equipment on the grey list are not barred, but are tracked by the network 
for evaluation or other purposes. 
  
The black list contains all equipment identities that belong to equipment 
that needs to be barred. 
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3.4 Mechanism between the MS and the SGSN 
 
Background 
 
The GPRS network offers various security related services on the radio path. This 
is to give the user a secure and reliable service. The functions offered can be 
divided in three groups [1][7]:  
 
• Confidentiality of the user identity 
• Confidentiality of user data 
• Confidentiality of signalling information elements and connectionless user 
data 
 
Figure 3.6 gives an overview of the security functions and procedures between 
the GPRS network and the MS in the case of an attach request. 
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Figure 3.6 Attach procedure 
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To get a better understanding of the figure, each step is here explained in more 
detail: 
 
1. Attach Request  
The Attach Request includes: (IMSI or P-TMSI and old RAI, Classmark, 
CKSN, Attach Type, DRX Parameters, old P-TMSI Signature)  
 
2. Identification Request and Identification Response 
The new SGSN (SGSNn) sends an Identification Request to the old SGSN 
(SGSNo) if the SGSN has changed since detach, the Identification Request 
includes (P-TMSI, old RAI, old P-TMSI Signature). The SGSNo responds 
with Identification Response (IMSI, Authentication Triplets) if the MS is 
known otherwise it will respond with an error cause. This is only done if 
the MS identify itself with P-TMSI. 
 
3. Identity Request and Identity Response 
The SGSN sends an Identity Request (Identity Type = IMSI) to the MS if it 
is unknown in both the SGSNn and SGSNo. The MS will then responds with 
Identity Response (IMSI). 
 
4. Send authentication info (IMSI) and Send authentication info Ack 
(TRIPLETS) 
If the SGSN does not have any stored authentication triplets, a Send 
Authentication Info (IMSI) is sent to the HLR. The HLR responds with a 
Send Authentication Info Ack (Authentication Triplets). 
 
5. Authentication and Ciphering Request (RAND, CKSN, Ciphering Algorithm) 
and Authentication and Ciphering Response (SRES) 
When the SGSN receive the TRIPLETS it send a Authentication and 
Ciphering Request (RAND, CKSN, Ciphering Algorithm) to the MS which 
responds with Authentication and Ciphering Response (SRES). After 
sending this message the MS starts ciphering. The SGSN start ciphering 
after it receives the message from the MS. 
 
6. Identity Request and Identity Response (IMEI) 
If the SGSN decides to do an equipment check it sends Identity Request 
(Identity Type) to the MS. The MS then responds with Identity Response 
(Mobile Identity). 
 
7. Check IMEI and Check IMEI Ack 
If the SGSN decided to do a equipment check it can check this against the 
EIR by sending Check IMEI (IMEI) to it. The EIR responds with Check IMEI 
Ack (IMEI). 
 
8. Location updating procedures 
If the SGSN number has changed since detach or it attach for first time, it 
is necessary for the SGSN to initiate some Location updating procedures. 
This procedure includes informing HLR, which then will inform the SGSNo 
to cancel the MS and sends subscription data to the SGSNn. If Attach Type 
in step 1 indicated GPRS Attach while already IMSI attached, or combined 
GPRS and IMSI attach, then the VLR should also be updated if the Gs 
interface is installed. 
 
9. Attach Accept and Attach Complete 
The SGSN then selects Radio Priority SMS, and sends an Attach Accept (P-
TMSI, VLR TMSI, P-TMSI Signature, Radio Priority SMS) message to the 
MS. If the SGSN allocates a new P-TMSI the P-TMSI is included. The MS 
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acknowledges the received information by returning an AttachComplete 
message to the SGSN, if P-TMSI or VLR TMSI was changed. 
 
10. If VLR TMSI was changed, the SGSN confirms the VLR TMSI re-allocation 
by sending a TMSI Reallocation Complete message to the VLR. 
 
If the SGSN is not able to attach the MS or if the Attach Request cannot be 
accepted, the SGSN will return an Attach Reject (IMSI, Cause) message to the 
MS.  
 
This is a combined GPRS and IMSI Attach procedure and it is not always 
necessary to perform all the steps. E.g. if the MS is known in the SGSNo or 
SGSNn, step 3 will not be necessary.  
 
Confidentiality of the user identity 
 
The identity of the user is protected to avoid the possibility for an intruder to 
identify which subscriber is using a given resource on the radio path by listening 
to the signalling exchange or the user traffic. As a condition to accomplice this the 
IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) or any other information allowing 
a listener to derive the IMSI easily, should not normally be transmitted in clear 
text in any signalling message over the radio path. It is from a security point of 
view necessary that on the radio path a protected identifying method is used 
instead of the IMSI. The IMSI should not normally be used as addressing means. 
But when signalling procedures permit it, signalling information elements that can 
expose information about the mobile subscriber identity must be ciphered for 
transmission [1].   
 
To identify a mobile subscriber on the radio path a Temporary Logical Link 
Identity (TLLI) is used. The TLLI is a local number and has only a meaning in a 
given Routing Area (RA), it is accompanied by the Routing Area Identity (RAI). 
 
The relation between the TLLIs and IMSIs are stored in a database at the SGSN. 
So when a TLLI is received with a RAI that does not correspond to the current 
SGSN, the IMSI is requested from the SGSN in charge of the RA indicated in the 
RAI. If the address of that SGSN is unknown the IMSI is requested from the MS. 
 
When a new TLLI is allocated to a MS, it is transmitted from the SGSN to the MS 
in a ciphered mode produced with the GPRS-A5 algorithm. This is not completely 
the truth since the fixed part of the network can acquire the identification of the 
MS in clear. However this is a breach in the provision of the service, and should 
only be used when necessary to cope with malfunctioning, e.g. arising from 
software failure.  
 
Confidentiality of user data 
 
The SGSN can request security related information for a MS from the HLR/AuC 
corresponding to the IMSI, which will include an array of pairs of corresponding 
RAND and SRES. This is done in the HLR/AuC by using RAND and the key Ki in 
the A3 algorithm. The pairs are stored in the SGSN as part of the security 
information. The HLR/AuC responds the SGSN by sending the vectors RAND/SRES 
in the Authentication Vector Response which also includes the key Kc. 
 
These sets of information (RAND/SRES and Kc) are stored in the SGSN. And they 
should be marked as used when they have been used, but it is the operators that 
decide how many times a set can be used before it is marked. If there is no more 
unused sets left, the SGSN may use a used set. In order to get rid of sets that is 
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used the SGSN is to delete all the records marked as used, when it successfully 
request security related information from the HLR. The sets may also be re-sent 
by the HLR depending on the rules for re-use of sets set by the operator. 
 
Confidentiality of user information and signalling between MS and SGSN 
 
The needs for a protected mode of transmission are fulfilled by a ciphering 
function in the LLC layer. It is the GPRS-A5 algorithm that ciphers the LLC layer 
information. A mutual key setting is produced to allow the MS and the network to 
agree on the key Kc to be used in the ciphering and the deciphering algorithms 
GPRS-A5. The Kc is transmitted to the MS in the RAND value and it is derived 
from the RAND by using the A8 and the Subscriber Authentication key Ki. 
 
The MS and the SGSN must co-ordinate when the ciphering and the deciphering 
processes should start. The SGSN indicates if the ciphering should be used or not 
in the Authentication and Ciphering Request message, and the MS starts the 
ciphering after sending the Authentication and Ciphering Response message. In 
order for the enciphering bit stream at one end and the deciphering bit stream at 
the other end to coincide, the streams must be synchronised. This is done by 
using an explicit variable INPUT, the DIRECTION and the Kc in the algorithm 
GPRS-A5, illustrated in Figure 3.5. The synchronisation of ciphering at LLC frames 
level is done by a bit in the LLC header indicating if the frame is ciphered or not. 
 
When a inter SGSN routing area update occurs, the necessary information (e.g 
Kc, INPUT) is transmitted within the system infrastructure to enable the 
communication to proceed from the old SGSN to the new one. The key Kc may 
remain unchanged at Inter SGSN routing area update. 
 
The MS should indicate which version of the GPRS-A5 algorithm it supports when 
it wants to establish a connection to the network. The negotiation of the GPRS-A5 
algorithm happens during the authentication procedure. The network can decide 
to release the connection if there is no common GPRS-A5 algorithm, or if the MS 
indicates an illegal combination of supported algorithms. Otherwise the network 
selects one of the mutual acceptable versions of the GPRS-A5 algorithms to be 
used.     
 
3.5 GPRS Backbone 
 
The operator is responsible for the security of its own Intra-PLMN backbone, 
which includes all network elements and physical connections. The operator shall 
prevent unauthorised access to its Intra-PLMN backbone. A secure Intra-PLMN 
backbone guarantees that no intruder can eavesdrop or modify user information 
and signalling in the Intra-PLMN backbone[1]. 
 
The GPRS architecture utilises GPRS tunnelling and private IP addressing within 
the backbone to restrict unauthorized access to it. User traffic addressed to a 
network element shall be discarded. Firewall functionality may provide these 
means at the access points of the Intra-PLMN backbone. 
 
The Inter-PLMN links shall be negotiated between operators as part of the 
roaming agreement. They shall ensure that the Inter-PLMN links are secure 
providing integrity and confidentiality. For example, secure links can be achieved 
by point to point links, private Inter-PLMN backbones or encrypted tunnels over 
the public Internet [1]. 
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Operators shall be able to determine the origin of packets coming from the inter-
PLMN backbone. One example is to use a Frame Relay PVC between two 
operators. 
 
The GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) is the protocol between GPRS Support Nodes 
(GSNs) which allow multi-protocol packets to be tunnelled through it in the GPRS 
backbone network. All kind of protocols can be present in the GTP tunnel, which 
means al kinds of traffic from the subscribers, e.g. DNS queries, zone transfers 
and NTP syncs. Most likely GPRS operation and maintenance traffic goes over it, 
by HTTP, telnet or FTP. This is if no dedicated network for operation and 
maintenance is present. By default the GTP is not encrypted which means the 
traffic carried over it is transparent[14][25]. 
 
In the signalling plane, GTP specifies a tunnel control and management protocol 
that allows the SGSN to provide GPRS network access for a MS. Signalling is used 
to create, modify and delete tunnels[28].  
 
In the transmission plane, GTP uses a tunnelling mechanism to provide a service 
for carrying user data packets. The choice of path is dependent on whether the 
user data to be tunnelled requires a reliable link or not.  
 
The GTP protocol is implemented only by SGSNs and GGSNs. No other systems 
need to be aware of GTP's presence. GPRS MSs are connected to an SGSN 
without being aware of GTP. It is assumed that there will be a "many-to-many" 
relationship between SGSNs and GGSNs. A SGSN may provide service to many 
GGSNs. A single GGSN may associate with many SGSNs to deliver traffic to a 
large number of geographically diverse mobile stations. 
3.6 Interworking between GPRS networks 
The primary reason for the interworking between the GPRS networks is to support 
roaming GPRS subscribers [21]. This so subscribers will be able to access from 
other operators GPRS networks to their home network, that means from VPLM to 
the HPLMN. A general model for GPRS network interworking is shown in Figure 
3.7. 
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Figure 3.7 Interworking GPRS networks 
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GPRS networks are connected to each other via interoperator backbone networks 
[10]. The inter-PLMN link may be any packet data network (1), e.g. Internet, or a 
dedicated link (2). Dedicated link may be chosen to fulfill QoS requirements of a 
certain protocol. Each GPRS operator may support IPSec and accompanying 
specification for authentication and encryption as a basic set of security 
functionality in its border gateways. However, other security protocols may be 
selected by a bilateral agreement between the GPRS operators. 
3.7 Interworiking GPRS PLMN and Packet Data Networks 
The GPRS are supporting interworking with Packet Data Networks (PDN) that is 
based on the Internet Protocol. These interworked IP networks can be either the 
Internet or Intranets. GPRS has the opportunity to operate with IPv4 and the new 
IPv6. As mention earlier and shown in Figure 3.8, the interworking point with IP 
networks is at the Gi interface [10][21]. 
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Figure 3.8 IP network interworking 
 
The Gi reference point is located between the GGSN and the external IP network. 
From the external point of view, the GGSN is seen as a normal IP router and can 
been seen in Figure 3.8. The Layer1 and Layer2 protocols are operator specific 
and are negotiated between e.g. a GPRS operator and an external IP network 
operator. 
 
The access to Internet, Intranet or ISP through GPRS may involve specification 
such as: user authentication, user’s authorization, end to end encryption between 
MS and Intranet or ISP and allocation of dynamic address belonging to the PLMN, 
Intranet or ISP addressing space. For this purpose GPRS PLMN may offers either 
direct transparent access to the Internet, or a non-transparent access to the 
Intranets or ISP.    
 
Transparent access to the Internet 
 
The MS is given an address belonging to the operator’s addressing space. The 
address is either a static address given at subscription time or a dynamic address 
given at PDP context activation. The received address is used for packet 
forwarding between the Internet nodes and the GGSN and as well to map packet 
within the GGSN. 
 
The MS need not to send any authentication request at the PDP context 
activation. And the GGSN do not need to participate in the user authentication or 
authorization processes.  
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The user authentication and encryption of the user data are done within the 
“Intranet protocol” if either of them is required. This is shown in Figure 3.9 where 
the communication is between a GPRS PLMN and an Intranet. The figure also 
shows that the security is ensured on an end-to-end basis between MS and the 
intranet by the “Intranet protocol”. The communication between GGSN and the 
Intranet may be performed over any network e.g. Internet, and there is no 
specific secure protocol between GGSN and the Intranet. IPSec is an “Intranet 
protocol” that can be used to offer the GPRS user to communicate over insecure 
public networks securely. 
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Figure 3.9 Transparent access to an Intranet 
 
Non-Transparent access to an Intranet or an ISP 
 
When non-transparent access to an Intranet or ISP is used, the MS is given an 
address, which belongs to the address space of the intranet or ISP. In the same 
way as the transparent access, the address is either a static address given at 
subscription time or a dynamic address given at PDP context activation. This 
received address is used for packet forwarding within the GGSN, the Intranet or 
the ISP. This again requires a link between the GGSN and an address allocation 
server belonging to the Intranet or the ISP. This server may be based on, e.g. 
RADIUS or DHCP [10][21]. 
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Information that is used for the authentication request from GGSN to Intranet or 
ISP comes from the user in the PDP context activation. The GGSN request user 
authentication and configuration from a server like, RADIUS as shown in Figure 
3.10. 
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Authentication, Configuration
RADIUS Access-Accept 
Authentication, Configuration
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responds with either an 
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in the GGSN. 
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RADIUS/DHCP client 
ISP/Intranet 
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Figure 3.10 Authentication and Configuration request between GGSN and Intranet or ISP 
 
It is also possible to do the authentication and configuration procedure by using 
RADIUS and DHCP. RADIUS is responsible for the authentication request, after 
the authentication request the DHCP handles the configuration procedure, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.11.                                               
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Figure 3.11 Authentication and Configuration request between GGSN and Intranet or ISP 
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The connection between the GPRS network and ISP can be arranged over any 
network, even an insecure one, such as the Internet. In case of an insecure 
connection a dedicated link or a special secured tunnel can be arranged using e.g. 
IPSec as a security protocol. The security protocol is defined by mutual 
agreement between the GPRS PLMN operator and the Intranet or ISP 
administrator [10],[21]. 
Security in GPRS 
 
 
29 
 
4 Security threats to the GPRS 
4.1 Intro 
The threats to the GPRS are very different from the Circuit Switched GSM. The 
security threats to the GSM are quite limited, there are not many hackers that 
can or will crack the obscurity SS7 protocol. The GPRS system are a much more 
exposed to intruders, because of it IP based backbone. It is a lot of people that 
have thoroughly knowledge about the TCP/IP in proportion to the SS7 [8]. 
 
Intruders to the GPRS system can be people or organization that attempts to 
breach the confidentiality, integrity, availability or otherwise attempts to abuse 
the GPRS in order to compromise services, defraud users or any parts in the 
GPRS system [4].  
4.2 Terminal and the SIM card 
Integrity of data 
 
The mobile phone may deal with some of the same threats as a normal computer 
that is connected to a network have, e.g. the Internet. Intruders to a mobile 
phone or a terminal may modify, insert or delete application or data stored in the 
terminal. This can be compared when a computer are getting a “virus” that 
attacks the system. Not only the terminal but also the SIM is a possible target to 
the integrity of the data in the same way as the terminal. It can also result that 
the access to the terminal or the SIM can be obtained either locally or remotely.  
 
Stolen terminal and SIM card 
 
Since the mobile phones are much smaller and lighter than a computer, it makes 
it much more easier to steal. There are two scenarios regarding stolen mobile 
equipment, use of stolen terminal without the SIM and use of terminal with the 
SIM card inserted. A stolen terminal without the SIM card result in loss to the 
owner with respect to the value of the terminals since the charging and billing is 
related to the SIM card. If the stolen terminal includes a valid SIM card, then the 
loss is greater until the operator disables the SIM card [7]. A disabled terminal 
are not useless, the possibility to manipulate the identity of the terminal and get 
access to services that an operator offers exist. The way to do this is to modify 
the IMEI of the terminal and than insert a valid SIM card in the terminal. 
 
Borrowed terminal and SIM 
 
Another threat is use of borrowed terminal and SIM. Users who have been given 
authorization to the equipment may misuse their privileges perhaps by exceeding 
agreed usage limitations [4]. 
 
Eavesdrop, masquerade or manipulate 
 
The SIM –terminal interface are also having threats with intruders eavesdropping 
data, intruders masquerade as a SIM or a terminal in order to intercept data and 
intruders that modify, insert, replay or delete user traffic or in other words 
manipulate the data. 
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Confidentiality of user data and authentication data 
 
Confidentiality of user data and authentication data in the SIM card together with 
confidentiality of certain user data in the terminal may be threats for the owner. 
Intruders may get access to personal user data stored by the user in the terminal 
or the SIM card, this might be telephone books and messages belonging to the 
user. When it comes to the confidentiality of the authentication data in the SIM 
card, the intruders are probably interested to access authentication data stored 
by the service provider, like the authentication key. 
 
Cloned SIM card 
 
To get the authentication key, the intruders probably have to clone the SIM card. 
The fastest way to do this is to physically have the SIM card, but it is also 
possible to clone the SIM card over the Air. If they have the opportunity to have a 
cloned SIM card, they might want to listen to the real subscribers call or even 
make calls that would be billed to the original subscriber account [23].  
 
Non-type approved terminals and defective equipment 
 
Non-type approved terminals and defective equipment can be a source to 
disturbing the network’s performance and may affect the quality of service 
offered to other subscribers [7].  
 
4.3 Interface between the MS and the SGSN 
The significant point of attack between the MS and the SGSN is actually the radio 
interface or the air interface between the terminal equipment and the BSS. 
Threats related to the air interface can be separated in four different parts. These 
four parts are; unauthorized access to the data, threats to the integrity, denial of 
service and unauthorized access to service [4]. 
 
Unauthorized access to the data  
 
User traffic, signalling data or control data are information intruders may 
eavesdrop on the air interface. The signalling data or the control data are 
information that can be useful to conducting active attacks on the GPRS system 
and give the intruders access to secure management data. 
 
It is possible for intruders to masquerade as a network element, e.g. a BTS and 
intercept user traffic, signalling data or control data over the air interface. 
 
Intruders may observe the time, rate, length, sources or destination of messages 
in order to get access to the information. This is a passive way to analyse the 
traffic. Intruders may actively initiate communication sessions and then observe 
in the same way as the passive traffic analysis to obtain access to information. 
 
Threats to the integrity 
 
Manipulation of user traffic, signalling data or control data may occur in an 
accidental or a deliberate manner. The integrity is exposed if the traffic and the 
data in any way are modified, inserted, replayed or deleted. 
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Denial of service attacks  
 
To jam users traffic is a physical intervention of denying someone the services. 
The user traffic, signalling data and control data are by jamming prevented from 
being transmitted over the air interface. Another way to prevent the information 
or data to be transmitted is by including specific protocol failures. It is possible 
for intruders to induce these failures by physical meanings.  
 
Another way to deny services is by masquerade as a network element and then 
prevent the user traffic, signalling data or control data from being transmitted. 
 
Unauthorized access to services 
 
A possibility for an intruder to get unauthorized access to services can be by 
masquerading as a BST towards a user and then hijacking the users connecting 
after authentication has been established. 
4.4 GPRS backbone 
The threats to the backbone are as mention in the beginning of the chapter 2.3 
dealing with many of the same threats as the air interface. Threats that are 
described between the MS and the SGSN are also threats to wired parts in the 
backbone. These threats may be unauthorized access to data, threats to the 
integrity, denial of services and unauthorized access to services. 
 
An important threat to the backbone are that trusted sources are misusing their 
privileges to attack the PLMN backbone or from the PLMN backbone. Since it has 
been estimated that the lion’s part of all network attacks come from trusted 
sources [14]. That means that it is exposed that attacks are being initiated from 
the PLMN backbone, and people with access to the PLMN have a good opportunity 
to initiate such attacks. 
 
It is not obvious that the IP based PLMN backbone is only dedicated to GPRS 
traffic. A possibility is that the PLMN backbone is operating on top of the already 
existing core network. The core IP network might then carry various types of 
traffic nodes in the GPRS network might be addressable from a large community 
of people, in fact from the whole Internet. Traffic that may pass the core network 
is of course the GPRS Tunnelling Protocol, but also other IP based protocols such 
as DNS queries and NTP syncs. 
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Figure 4.1 Operator using existing IP- network as PLMN 
 
Since the GTP protocol is not encrypted by default it is easy for a person that 
have access to the intermediate node between the GGSN and SGSN to eavesdrop 
e.g. the traffic of the GPRS subscribers. 
 
Another threat related to the PLMN backbone is how to handle the operations and 
maintenances of its NE. As shown in the figure 4.4 it is possible to have 
maintenance workstation to administrate such problems. The interface should be 
protected against intruders from e.g. the Internet in case of any insecure ports 
are opened such as 20 and 21 for FTP and 8888 for node administration via HTTP. 
The interface for operations and maintenances are not standardized, but is an 
interface that is a supplementary from Ericsson given the name Gom [14].  
 
4.5 Interworking between GPRS networks 
The security between different GPRS operators depends on the reliability to each 
other. Are the other operators to be trusted or not? As mention in the security 
chapter, there are different bilateral agreements between the GPRS operators. 
 
Like the treats related to the backbone, the threats between GPRS operators are 
in many way the same. The opportunity for trusted people in the different 
network to misuse the position and export actions like: 
 
• Eavesdropping  
• Masquerading 
• Traffic analysis 
• Manipulation 
• Denial of service 
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The fact that the different operators actually are competing for the same 
subscribers, this means that they also can constitute a threat to each other. A 
PLMN might want to hurt or attack the other operators network or subscribers in 
order to make the subscribers change operator.  
 
One relevant contingency is to make denial of service attacks. The attacking 
operator may prevent, by physical intervention subscribers traffic, from being 
transmitted or delaying transmission on purpose. This may be done while the 
subscribers are using the visited or attacking network, or it can be attacked 
outside from the visiting network against the subscribers home networks. One 
physically way to intervene such attacks is to inducing protocol with failures so 
the network cannot handle the protocol in a right manner.  
 
4.6 Interworking GPRS PLMN and Packet Data Networks 
To protect the GPRS system against hackers or intruders that want to hurt or 
utility the GPRS system from an external network, like Internet are essential. A 
hacker that breaks into from an external IP-network can in many ways be a 
threat to the data confidentiality, integrity or availability. 
 
People that are trying to get access inside the GPRS system from an external 
network are often doing this to show their technical skills and gain reputation in 
the hackers’ environment. The purpose of the attack might be to cause harm to 
the GPRS system or steal information. After they have stolen the information they 
have the opportunity to sell the information in order to receive money [11].  
 
A hacker could also cause huge bills for the GPRS users. Since the GPRS billing is 
based on the amount of transferred and received data. It may be possible to 
cause harm for the GPRS users by sending large spam e-mails from the external 
network or to create a virus located at users MS. This virus may have a property 
to send dummy packets from the MS without the user even knowing it [10].   
 
The GGSN has the opportunity to use either static or dynamic routing. When 
dynamic routing is used, it is relatively easy to launch a denial of service attack 
against the GGSN, by giving the GGSN false routing information [14]. 
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5 Security testing of the GPRS system 
5.1 Background 
 
In this chapter we will describe a security test that were performed at Ericsson AS 
in Grimstad. In order to get an understanding of what kind of threats and the 
level of work that is put into it, we will try to explain how a hacker prepare before 
an attack[28]. 
5.2 How to prepare for a hack 
 
While there is no easy recipe to hacking, most system intrusions can be divided 
into four steps. Depending on techniques involved or level of difficulty, there 
could be less or more, but these four steps should give an idea on how hackers 
with some experience would prepare a system intrusion:  
 
1. Learn as much as possible about the target before the attack. The 
techniques involved can be passive to bordering on mini-attacks 
themselves. Plan out the goals for the attack. Then use the knowledge 
gained to develop a plan, no matter how small or quick the hack is.  
 
2. Initial access to the system. This step has to be considered as the real 
attack part. This could be anything from ftp access to a sendmail bug to 
logging in as a "regular" user. If successful, it should either create an 
opportunity for indirect or direct access to the system.  
 
3. Full system access. At this level most goals developed can be carried out. 
This will most likely involve password file retrieved for cracking, trojan 
installed, secret file copied, etc. So this stage usually involves either 
taking advantage of a bug that allows higher privileges to be obtained, 
taking advantages of miss configured system parameters, or a 
combination of both.  
 
4. Tracks are covered and backdoors installed. System logging is doctored to 
remove traces of the attack and what was done during the attack, and 
either defence are lowered or files are tampered with, to allow quicker and 
easier access. Some experienced hackers even patch the system to keep 
less experienced hackers out of the system (who might possibly tip off a 
Sys Admin). Once step four is complete, hackers will refer to this system 
being owned.  
 
 
In order to get an overview of the information about GPRS out amongst people 
whose interest is hacking, have we browsed sites and newsgroups with focus on 
this subject. And the impression we have is that there is not much information 
out there. But if someone has any information on GPRS they usually has a very 
good overview of it. When it comes to hacking in general there is a lot of 
information and tools, and some of the information gives an impression of 
comprehensive knowledge on the different systems. Even though the information 
today on the GPRS system is not very broad, we see that the interest of GSM is 
great. It is therefore likely to believe that GPRS, which is based on a well-known 
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architecture and components, will be a popular target for attacks. The fact that 
the billing for system usage is usually high will be a factor that accelerates the 
eagerness to hack the system. 
5.3 The security test lab 
5.3.1 Background 
Ericsson AS has a test lab dedicated for testing the security of the system. It is 
fully equipped with all of the system components including user traffic. Since the 
GPRS system is in continuous development it is impossible to guarantee that the 
components are completely without faults. It is therefore important to have 
defined levels of risks with procedures for what action to take for each level[29].  
 
Four Risk and danger levels are defined [29]: 
1. High: any vulnerability that allows an attacker to gain immediate access 
into a machine, to gain superuser access, or to bypass a firewall. 
2. Medium: any vulnerability that provides information, degrades 
performance, or has a high potential of giving system access to an 
intruder. 
3. Low: any vulnerability that provides information that could potentially lead 
to a compromise. 
4. None: No vulnerability was detected. Lowest possible risk, but this does 
not guarantee total security. 
 
If a test returns a danger level “high” or “medium” it is consider as it failed the 
test. With the danger level “low” and “none” the test is considered as passed. 
Even thou a test is considered as passed on risk level “low” it does not mean it 
can be forgotten, the exploitation of a “low” risk vulnerability can be a used as a 
part in a larger means. 
 
The CGSN platform is built out of standard components, including the operating 
system. The Unix operating system Solaris from Sun is used in addition to 
VxWorks. Solaris is widely used on desktop workstations and on server 
installations. It is in the latter capability it is used in the CGSN. It is a multi-user 
system and is well suited to perform tasks that require well-defined access rights. 
VxWorks is a real-time operating system used in systems where time is essential 
[17].  
 
Solaris is commonly used in desktop workstations and on server installations, and 
GPRS is based IP technology, which both are well-known systems for persons 
with bad intents. This and the fact that information for e.g. billing will be situated 
here, make the probability for an attack high. 
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5.3.2 The test lab 
Backbone
External 
PLMN 
 
CGSN 
DNS 
PXM
NTP 
BGW 
Test point 2 
HLR MSCBSS MS 
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Test point 5
Test point 3
SI
M
 
Test point 1 
 ISP 
  
Figure 5.1 Overview of the test point 
 
 
 
A security laboratory (Sec Lab) will be connected to a GPRS network, external 
PLMN, MS and ISP for testing. This security lab consists of different hardware and 
software components that will be used as tools for testing the security of the 
different GPRS system parts. We have defined 5 points where the security of the 
system can be exploited. 
 
 
Test point 1 
 
This security test point is not included in Ericsson’s test lab, nevertheless it is a 
point where security can be jeopardised. The vulnerability of this point is 
described more in detail in chapter 4.2. 
 
Test point 2 
 
This security test point is from an MS. This MS is a Solaris based computer, which 
is connected to the Sec Lab backbone network as a gateway. All other computers 
in the Sec Lab are connected through the gateway. 
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Test point 3  
 
This security test point is on the backbone network of the GSN. The test will be 
executed directly towards the NEs. 
 
Test point 4 
 
This security test point is from an external PLMN. The Sec Lab will be connected 
to an external PLMN network as one of the host in PLMN for testing.  
 
Test point 5 
 
This security test point is from an ISP. The Sec Lab is connected as a host in the 
ISP. The ISP is connected to the router interface (Gi) of the CGSN.  
 
5.3.3 Test environment 
 
In the SecLab, different types of security test tools are implemented. In order to 
stay up to date when new security flaws are discovered is it profitably to use 
commercial available security test tools. When new security flaws are discovered 
is it possible to add the check for this new flaw to the tool. In addition many of 
these test tools offer users the ability to customise tests and write their own test 
scripts. The software tools we used and will describe here, are called Nessus and 
Ethereal. In addition to those two, we also participated in some tests with tools 
from ISS. The tools from ISS are not freely distributed. But the ISS security tools 
are considered to be among the most comprehensive there is. More information 
on the ISS tools in appendix B.      
 
Nessus Security Scanner 
  
Nessus is security scanner software, which will check remotely a given network 
and determine whether bad guys may break into it, or misuse it in some way. It 
will detect all services on any port and attempt to exploit the vulnerability. The 
scanner is built inn a way where every test is like a plugin. This makes it possible 
to customise a test or add your own test. 
 
Ethereal 
Ethereal is a free network protocol analyser for Unix and Windows. It allows you 
to examine data from a live network or from a capture file on disk. You can 
interactively browse the capture data, viewing summary and detail information 
for each packet. Ethereal has several powerful features, including a rich display 
filter language and the ability to view the reconstructed stream of a TCP session. 
 
When we used the test lab at Ericcson AS in Grimstad, we run tests on the 
system with two test tools: 
 
• Nessus Security Scanner (For scanning on network level) 
• Ethereal (a network protocol analyser for Unix and Windows) 
 
Examples of security holes are like wrong file permission, absence of root or users 
password, bugs in services in the OS [29].  
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5.3.4 The Security test with Nessus on RPC (Remote Procedure Call) 
vulnerability. 
 
Since the security test may contain information that is considered confidential by 
Ericsson, it is removed from the main report. The results from the test are in 
Appendix 1, which will be made available on request and approval from Ericsson 
or Lars Line. 
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6 Protecting the different GPRS parts 
6.1 Introduction 
The meaning of protecting or preventing different part in the GPRS system is also 
about avoiding attacks to the system. We will in this chapter focus on the 
possibilities to avoid security attacks to the GPRS system. 
 
6.2 Subscriber authentication 
Subscription is checked during the GPRS attach procedure and also during the 
PDP Context Activation procedure. The GGSN implicitly checks its internal context 
related to the destination address for each mobile terminated packet. If there is a 
context associated with the PDP address the packet shall be forwarded to the MS, 
otherwise the packet shall be discarded or rejected depending on the 
implemented protocol [21].  
 
The SGSN authenticates the subscriber when attaching to the system. This 
authentication is done so the system will be able to properly bill the subscriber. 
When the subscriber is connected, he will be able to e.g. send and receive SMS 
messages. The subscriber is authenticated again when the PDP context is 
activated. This authentication is done to make sure the user is allowed to the 
network he is trying to connect to. This double authentication may seem 
extraneous but it is a security measures that protect the GPRS subscriber. 
Actually it is also protecting the network and the service provider against 
undesirable subscribers [14].  
 
To further increase the security of the authentication procedure it is possible to 
use one-time passwords in the GPRS systems in the same way it is done in the 
regular dial-up connections. Normally an external device such as an electronic 
key ring is used to generate this password. This password is sent to the server 
that checks the password against a special RADIUS server capable of handling 
one-time passwords. An external device might be needless in a GPRS system. 
Instead the MS can be used. E.g. before the subscriber activates the PDP context 
he sends an SMS message to a specific telephone number. The message includes 
a pin code and the name of the PDP context that the subscriber want to use. The 
server that receives the message checks if the pin code is correct. If so, the 
server sends an SMS message in response to the subscriber with a one-time 
password. The subscriber then uses the one-time password when activating the 
PDP context. Another solutions would be to use the storing capabilities in the MS 
to store pre-generated one-time password that can be unlocked with a pin code. 
 
Protecting the GPRS system with use of firewalls  
A firewall is a set of related programs, located at a network gateway server that 
protects the resources of a private network from users from other networks . In 
the GPRS view of using firewalls there are lots of places where firewalls are 
needed in order to secure the system. The operators want to protect the GPRS 
equipment, the subscribers need end user security, and directly connected 
companies want to protect their vital Intranet resources. The GPRS operators 
may also want to disallow some bandwidth-demanding protocols, this to ensure 
that a group of singles subscribers do not consume so much bandwidth that other 
subscribers are noticeably affected [14]. 
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From the GPRS operators point of view there are two main purposes witch should 
be protected against attacks originated from the Internet [14]. This is the GPRS 
equipment and the mobile terminals, this also include protections of subscribers 
information or other information that are stored in the GPRS network or in the 
mobile terminal.  
 
Or as the ETSI describe how the network control screening should be performed 
[21]: 
The PLMN administration and or the GPRS service provider shall set basic 
screening functionality, if applicable, e.g. firewall to reduce the risk of fraud and 
misuse. This is to ensure the integrity of the network and to protect subscribers. 
 
Between the GGSN and the external IP network the following assumptions are 
valid in generic case [21]: 
 
• A firewall is configured by the GPRS operator. In general, all applications 
that are using IP as the underlying protocol are supported, but the GPRS 
operator may restrict their usage. In most cases it is necessary to restrict 
access from external IP networks to the GPRS network. 
 
• A Domain Name Server is managed by the GPRS operator or it can be 
managed by the of the external IP network operator.  
 
• From the GPRS network's point of view, the allocation of a dynamic IP 
address is done by the GGSN. The GGSN may allocate these addresses by 
itself or use an external device such as a DHCP server. This external 
device may be operated by an external organisation such as an ISP or 
Intranet operator. 
 
Where the Firewall, DHCP and DNS are placed is illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 GPRS Network connected to External IP Network 
 
The Figure 6.1 shows that a firewall is used to protect the GPRS network. The 
operator may consider that only traffic initiated from the MS and not from the 
Internet should pass through the firewall. This is done for two reasons, to restrict 
the traffic in order to protect the MS from attacks and also to protect the MS from 
receiving unrequested traffic. Unrequested traffic may be unwanted for the 
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subscribers since they are paying for the traffic received as well. To be able to 
only allow traffic that is initiated from the MS a firewall that is capable of stateful 
inspection is needed [14]. 
 
GPRS system is more complicated compared to normal office environments. 
Normal offices have an open network on the inside and are connected to the 
outside through a firewall. This implies that the personnel and departments on 
the internal network trust each other since the traffic between them does not 
pass through the firewall. In the GPRS system it is not possible to assume that 
the mobile subscribers belonging to the same GGSN should trust each other. As 
shown in Figure 6.2 MS A and MS B can reach each other without passing through 
a firewall placed between the GGSN and the Internet if the two connecting 
tunnels do not utilise APN routing [14]. 
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Figure 6.2 MS A access MS B without passing through a firewall 
 
APN routing is one of two ways to route traffic from and to the GSN node [15]. 
APN routing and routing decision is taken on the basis of which MS APN network 
the packet arrives from. When APN routing is used the connection between the 
GGSN and the external network must be a point to point connection like a IPSec 
tunnel, a PPP link or a dedicated Virtual Circuit e.g. ATM VC. The other way is to 
use Normal IP Routing that is using normal routing protocol like OSPF and normal 
routing algorithms. 
 
Figure 6.3 illustrate both APN routing and Normal IP Routing. If Normal IP 
Routing is used the GGSN will use normal IP forwarding policy for the MS. The 
GGSN looks at the destination IP address in the packet and forward the packet to 
the router that have the lowest cost towards the Internet host. This could lead to 
that the packet is being forwarded to R2 through the ISP 2 network even though 
the MS actually belongs to the ISP 1. 
 
Security in GPRS 
 
 
42 
SGSN 
 
MS GGSN
Radio 
network 
GPRS backbone
R1
ISP 1 
Network (IP) 
APN 1 
R2
ISP 2 
Network (IP) 
APN 2 
Internet (IP)
H 
Internet host
Gb 
Gn 
Gi
MS belonging to APN 1
 
Figure 6.3 APN Routing and Normal IP Routing 
 
If APN Routing is used, then the GGSN will base the forwarding decision upon 
which external network the MS belongs to. This means that the IP packets from 
the MS always will be forwarded to the R1 through ISP1 for then to reach the 
Internet host.  
 
Because the MSs are behind the firewall between the GGSN and the Internet 
other devices such as SGSN, DNS servers and O&M workstations in the operators 
network will not protected against the MSs. The packet filters in the GGSN and 
the external firewall should be configured to drop MS packets addressed to those 
interfaces. This is not just a problem when operator uses a combined network, 
but also when operator uses separate Gi network. This is because the Gi interface 
itself and the backside of the firewall will be addressable at the IP level.  
  
A good solution is to use firewalls and healthy network designs where all the 
different networks interface are separated from each other. Figure 6.4 Possible 
network designs for operators using existing IP-network as PLMNshow how a 
network designs for operators using their existing IP-network as the PLMN. From 
the figure point of view the firewall has five interfaces the operators core IP-
network interface, Gi, Gn, Gom and Gp interface [14]. 
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Figure 6.4 Possible network designs for operators using existing IP-network as PLMN  
The use of firewall from a Gi interface point of view is a challenge when use of 
APN routing. If the firewall not understand APN routing a dedicatied firewall for 
each of the connections is needed. This connection could e.g. from the GGSN to 
the internet, ISP’s or a company dedicated connection. The figure 7.x.x5 illustrate 
how this can be done. Multiple firewalls can be used to get redundant connections 
to a network, the placement of two firewall from the GGSN to the Internet is 
illustrating this. 
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Figure 6.5 Firewall and APN routing 
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6.3 Virtual Private Networks 
In a firewall server it is typically installed some VPN software [22]. A VPN is a 
private data network that makes use of the public telecommunication 
infrastructure, maintaining privacy through the use of a tunnelling protocol and 
security procedures. It can be seen as private network over a public network, e.g. 
the Internet. Using VPN involves encryption of data before sending it through a 
network and decryption of the data at the receiving end. IPSec is the most 
common protocol that is used to achieve a VPN in the GPRS system, the IPSec is 
described in more details later. Secure virtual connections are created between 
two machines, a machine and a network or two networks. In the GPRS point of 
view the machine can actually be the MS. To use a VPN instead of leasing a 
dedicated line can save a lot of money for the different companies. 
 
In the GPRS system there are different places where the VPN technique can be 
used. It is possible for a mobile client to establish an end-to-end VPN tunnel from 
the MS to a corporate network. In a costumers point of view, and end-to-end VPN 
connections, provide the best security since the traffic goes encrypted the whole 
way and is show inFigure 6.6. 
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Figure 6.6 End-to-end VPN connection setting [11] 
 
 
End-to-end VPN is a good solution for the users, but this might be a problem or in 
conflict with LEAs wishes. This is because the LEA through use of LIN can require 
user data and other network related information whenever wanted, and this can 
be difficult to fulfil when end-to-end VPN is used. 
 
Another use of VPN is to use VPN between the GGSN and the corporate Intranet. 
That means the security from the MS to the Gi interface is leaved on behalf of the 
GPRS operators, and this will also make it easier to fulfil the requirements from 
the LEA. Since the encryption algorithm in the GGSN often has a limit of 56-bit 
[14]. The operators may use additional hardware outside the GGSN, e.g. firewall 
or other device that is capable of VPN tunnelling to get a more secure VPN. This 
should probably be done since a cryptographic algorithm with 56-bit keys is 
considers not strong enough in most of today's situations.  
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No security is by default provided in the GTP to protect the communication 
between different GPRS operators [25]. As mention in the chapter about 
interworking between GPRS operators the protecting from another network can 
be basted on different security functions in the Border Gateways. A security 
mechanism that may be considered is for example IP Security. 
6.4 IP Security - IPSec 
GPRS operators may support the security protocol IPSec. IPSec consists of 
several open standards and its purpose is to ensure security private 
communication over IP networks. E.g. inside GPRS backbone, between different 
GPRS Networks and over the Internet. It is based on standards developed by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). IPSec ensures confidentiality, integrity 
and authentication of data communications across an insecure, public IP network 
[10]. 
 
IPSec offers encryption and authentication on network layer. It provides an end-
to-end security solution in the network architecture itself. Thus the end systems 
and applications do not need to know how to handle security issues. Encrypted 
packets look like ordinary IP packets and thus they can be easily routed through 
any IP network, such as GPRS or the Internet, without the intermediate network 
nodes know about encryption. The only devices that know about the encryption 
are the end points. This feature greatly reduces both implementation and 
management costs.  
 
IPSec consists of a pair of protocols that implement the available security 
services. These two protocols are the Authentication Header (AH) and the 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). The AH provides access control, connection 
message integrity, authentication and antireplay protection. The ESP support the 
same services as the AH plus confidentiality. These two protocols can be used by 
themselves or together to provide exactly the mix of services that the user wants 
[24]. 
 
IPSec can operate in two different modes, this is transport mode or tunnel mode. 
The transport mode can only be used when both the source and the destination 
system understand IPSec. In most case IPSec is used in tunnel mode allowing the 
implementation of the IPSec in the network architecture without modifying the 
operating system or any applications on PCs, servers, and hosts. This is also the 
situation in GPRS [10]. 
 
Figure 6.7 illustrates IPSec in transport mode. In transport mode, it is only the IP 
payload that is encrypted. The original IP header is left intact. This mode has the 
advantage of adding only a few bytes to each packet.   
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Figure 6.7 IPSec transported mode 
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In Figure 6.8 IPSec is operating in tunnel mode. When tunnel mode is used, the 
entire original IP datagram is encrypted. The original IP header and the data 
becomes the payload in a new IP packet.  
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Figure 6.8 IPSec tunneled mode 
 
Security in GPRS 
 
 
47 
 
7 Security result and result to the test 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of the results from each of the five issues in the theoretical 
part. The chapter also includes the results from the test that was done at 
Ericsson. 
7.2 Terminal and SIM card 
The mobile phone user decides himself or herself how to take care of it. The 
owner of the mobile phone is responsible for making the phone a difficult target 
for a thief. It is also necessary for the owner to have a secure access to the 
terminal. It should not be easy to modify or get access to the local stored data in 
the mobile phone or get access to external data stored in e.g. an Intranet, 
through the terminal. 
 
How to handle the IMEI stored in the ME in a secure way is a challenge for both 
the manufactures of the ME and the different operators. 
 
The possibility to clone SIM card and get the secret authentication key Ki, is 
realistic and should be taken into consideration.  
7.3 Between the MS and the SGSN 
Eavesdropping is a security breach that has to be taken into consideration. And it 
calls for the operators to choose good algorithms to be used for securing the 
interface between the MS and the SGSN. 
 
Information over the radio path allowing a listener to derive the identity of the 
subscribers should not be transmitted in clear text. 
7.4 GPRS Backbone 
It is the PLMN operators decision to protect the backbone. As mentioned before, a 
fair share of all known intrusions are accomplished from inside or inside 
information, e.g. an employee or former employee. The fact that the GPRS 
backbone often is the same as the corporate backbone makes it important to 
protect it. The GTP offers an option for encryption, but it is not encrypted by 
default. The operation and maintenance of the different nodes can be done 
remotely and it is an operators choice who and how this is done.  
7.5 Interworking between GPRS networks 
The security between different PLMN operators are based on bilateral 
agreements.  
 
BG’s are used to protect the PLMN network from other PLMN networks. 
Security in GPRS 
 
 
48 
7.6 Interworking GPRS PLMN and external networks 
In view of the fact that there are many people that have thorough knowledge 
about the IP protocol, intruders from an external network such as the Internet 
imply a real threat to the GPRS system. 
 
A firewall between the GGSN and the external network should be used to protect 
operators network and the subscribers against intruders. A stateful inspection 
capable firewall should be used. 
 
The operators should consider using static routes to avoid denial of service attack 
against the GGSN. This is because it is relatively easy to give the GGSN false 
routing information when dynamic routing is used. 
 
 
7.7 Test results  
Since the security test results may contain information that is considered 
confidential by Ericsson, it is removed from the main report. The results from the 
test are in Appendix 1, which will be made available on request and approval 
from Ericsson or Lars Line.
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8 Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
From the results in chapter seven, this chapter is a discussion on these results. 
8.2 Terminal and SIM card 
The normal way to protect the ME and the SIM card is by letting the user type a 
PIN-password before the user is getting permission to use the ME and accessing 
the SIM card. Another method to identification and access control to the terminal 
is by biometrics, like eye features, fingerprints, voice recognition and signatures 
[7]. The owner of the terminal has to make sure that the phones are left in a 
secure modus, so a thief does not get access to the data stored in the terminal or 
access to an Intranet if the connection to the Intranet is established and opened. 
A possible solution to this problem might be to disable the connection regularly so 
the subscriber has to reactivate and again perform authentication to the Intranet. 
It is not obvious that a user who has been given access to the terminal does not 
take advantage of it and misuse the terminal to access local or external data that 
is available.    
 
The manufactures treat of the IMEI has not been strict enough. This has done it 
easier for a thief to modify the IMEI in the ME and introduce the ME with a valid 
SIM card for the network. Another opportunity is to use an already existing IMEI 
number and introduce the ME with a SIM card for a new PLMN. Some PLMN can 
detect if there are duplicate IMEI in their network. If the PLMN notice that there 
are two phones with the same IMEI connected to the network, the PLMN can 
close the account for both the legitimate subscriber and the attacker. This is done 
because the PLMN cannot distinguish between the legitimate and the fake 
subscriber.  
 
The IMEI should be stored in the ME in a way that makes it easy to read, but very 
difficult and meaningless to change. This means that not only the manufactures, 
but also the different operators should treat the IMEI so it is complicated to 
introduce ME with illegal IMEI to the network. It should be hard for stolen and 
non-type approved ME that do not conform to the telecommunication standards 
to be connected to the network. This should also be a wish from the operators 
view, since the operators are concerned if the non-type approved ME is disturbing 
the system. A non-type approved ME may give a drop of quality of services for 
other legal subscribers and perhaps result in loss of subscribers using the 
services. Witch again has influence for the operator’s reputation and earnings.   
 
The possibility for attacker to retrieve the authentication key, Ki, from the SIM 
card and then clone the SIM card is probably one of the biggest threats to the 
security in GPRS. A security research group from the Smartcard Developer 
Association and the ISAAC discovered a flaw in the COMP128 algorithm that 
effectively enabled them to retrieve the secret key, Ki, from a SIM [23]. The 
attack was performed on a SIM card they had physical access to. When this 
attacks was performed, they actually had to have access to the SIM card for at 
least eight hours. This time is greatly reduced since the equipment to do such 
attacks and the SIM cards has been considerably improved. The time to get 
physically access to a SIM card is actually now less than ten minutes, which is 
very realistic.  
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The attack was based on a chose-challenge attack by a PC that made about 
150.000 challenge to the SIM and the SIM generated the SRES and the session 
key, Kc, based on the challenge and the secret key. This could be done since the 
COMP128 algorithm is broken in such a way that it reveals information about the 
Ki when appropriate RAND are given as arguments to the A8 algorithm. Why it 
now takes less then ten minutes to perform such attacks, is because the SIM card 
and the smartcard reader which is connected to the PC, is able to perform this 
with a much higher rate.  
 
To get the Ki by attacks over-the-air and then clone the SIM should also be 
possible from the SDA and ISAAC point of view. The over-the-air attack is based 
on the fact that the MS is required to response to every challenge made by the 
GPRS network. This is different from the UMTS system where the network is 
responding the MS. Over-the-air attacks can be done with a false BTS bombing 
the MS with challenges and re-construct the secret key from these responses. 
One problem is that the MS has to be available to the attacker over the air for the 
whole time it takes to conduct the attack. It is possible to split the attack in 
smaller parts. One way to do this is to just tease the phone for a short time every 
day on the victim’s way to work.  Since the time it takes to clone the SIM card is 
much faster, is it more difficult for the victim to notice that the battery level has 
changed. This is because the phone is using more battery when it is exposed for 
an attack. 
 
An opportunity with cloned SIM card is that an attacker is only interested in 
listening to the calls of the subscriber. To do so the attacker can stay passive and 
invisible to the GPRS network and just listen to the call of the subscriber. Since 
the attacker is invisible to the network, the network cannot notice that there are 
two identical phones connected and the account of the subscribers is not closed.  
 
A corrupt GPRS dealer is a possible attacker that would make cloned SIM cards. 
The corrupt employee would do so e.g. to sell cloned cards to a third parties who 
wish to stay anonymous and do not want to buy valid SIM cards or sell it to a 
certain customer so the customer can eavesdrop on the owner’s calls. 
 
The cloned SIM card is usable until the subscribers gets a new SIM card, this can 
actually be for a very long time since it is not often the subscribers are receiving 
a new SIM card from the operators, and the time does not play a part when it is 
the GPRS dealer that is cloning the SIM card. 
8.3 Between the MS and SGSN 
The interface between the MS and the SGSN is amongst the most exposed 
elements in GPRS. It is therefore vital that it is strongly protected. As mentioned 
earlier the GPRS system offers services on the radio path to give the user a 
secure and reliable service with confidentiality of the user identity, confidentiality 
of user data and confidentiality of signalling information elements and 
connectionless user data. 
 
In order to take care of the secure and reliable services for the users, the GPRS 
system use authentication and data encryption between the MS and the SGSN. In 
the GPRS authentication procedure the same algorithm is used as in the GSM 
system, this algorithm is the A3 and the A8. Unfortunately the COPM128 
algorithm that is used by the most operators for the A3 and A8 is broken. How 
the weakness in COMP128 is exploited is described over in the terminal 
discussion. The operator or the standardisation organisation can develop new 
algorithm to improve the security. Since the algorithm is stored in the SIM card, 
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the network operator can make the changes themselves and does not need to 
involve the hardware or software manufacturers. Other networks operator does 
not have to know anything about the different algorithm used, this because the 
triplets that are transferred to the visited network include the RAND and the 
SRES. SRES is the answer from the MS that is compared with the SRES in the 
visited network to confirm a right authentication.  
 
In relation to the data encryption between the MS and the SGSN a new A5 
algorithm has been implemented. This algorithm is not publicly known, but if it 
became so, the GPRS system would be more vulnerable for manipulation and 
eavesdropping.  
 
It is also difficult to fulfil that the identity of the subscribers should not be 
transmitted in clear text. A false BTS can e.g. catch up an Attach Request from a 
MS or it can transfer an Identity Request to the MS. The false BTS can from the 
response, get the IMSI and the IMEI, which again could be used to eavesdrop the 
subscriber. 
 
8.4 GPRS backbone 
The GPRS backbone connects a large part of the elements in the GPRS system 
and is therefore a part that will be attractive for intruders. The GPRS operator has 
to work out security measurements so it is prepared to meet this threat. If the 
backbone is not dedicated to GPRS traffic but also the operators corporate 
backbone, it might carry many types of traffic and be addressable for a lot of 
people, maybe the whole of the internet. To minimize the risk for external attack 
on the backbone, is it important to be able to identify and validate the traffic on 
it. The use of firewalls on the BG can help accomplice this. But this will only 
protect it for traffic from the outside. The traffic from the backbone itself and 
from MSs will not be filtered trough the BG firewall.    
 
In cases where someone gets access to this network they will be able to 
eavesdrop on the GPRS traffic going on it. The use of GTP encryption might lower 
this risk. The GTP is not encrypted by default but the use of this function has to 
be considered in cases with combined networks. The backbone carries also 
operation and maintenance information that has to be protected. With valid rights 
this kind of work can be carry out from any point of the network. With the use of 
tunnels and IPSec from dedicated point in the network to the NE the risk of 
someone seeing this traffic is minimized. However by using dedicated points in 
the network with secure connections to the NE for this kind of work, the flexibility 
of the system will be more limited. On the other hand we have the problem with 
lawful interception. This problem arises primarily if the user traffic on the 
backbone is strongly encrypted, in which will cause difficulties for the authorities 
that lawfully should have access to the traffic to get it.  
 
The NE is usually built out of commonly known elements for IP based networks. 
One example is the SGSN who in the case of Ericsson is running the Sun Solaris 
operating system. These kinds of systems are well known and are shipped with 
many pre-installed components. Many of these components are not required and 
used in the GPRS system, but nevertheless they represent a security risk since 
some have faults so they can be misused to get access to the rest of the 
operating system. Removing this kind of services will eliminate the chance for 
exploitation. But it may also make it harder to access the system. There are also 
services in use that carries security risks, this kind of services has to be 
monitored closely to avoid cases of exploitation.  
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8.5 Interworking between GPRS networks 
Normally all data and signalling between the GPRS operators are transmitted via 
BGs. The different packets that arrives the BG should fit to the bilateral 
agreements between the operators. The packet filters in the BG should be 
configured to drop packets addressed to those interfaces and network elements 
that is not according to the agreements.  
 
Even if the different operators have some kind of co-operation, they are actually 
competing about the same subscribers. But we have never heard of, or were able 
to find, any information about that this is considered as a threat to the operators 
or to the security in the GPRS.  
8.6 Interworking GPRS PLMN and external networks 
Newspapers sometimes brig articles on hackers that has got inside a system that 
is expected to be secured, especially if hackers have got access inside e.g. a 
banks data system. These data systems are protected by firewalls from the 
Internet, but hackers are able to get pass the firewall and get the opportunity to 
make damage to system. Since the GPRS system is connected to the Internet in 
the same way, hackers that are attacking the bank from the Internet are also a 
threat to the GPRS system. An important rule to fight the hackers is to have a 
practical procedure to upgrade the security systems to handle well-known 
security problems. It is also important that the security system give a notice if 
some intruders are trying to break into the system [26]. 
 
Since the GGSN have more than just Internet connections, but also connections 
like leased lines, virtual circuits and VPN tunnels, it makes it hard to use a 
standard, off the shelf, firewall solution. In fact it should also handle different 
types of interface, e.g. Ethernet and ATM. In the chapter protecting the different 
GPRS parts we have looked how to handle the complexity of placing firewalls 
more thorough.  
 
Even if the operators should consider using static routes, it is also a question 
about how to achieve redundant connections from GGSN to an external network. 
To achieve redundant connections it is mandatory to use dynamic routing. This is 
because when dynamic routing is used the router knows much more about how 
the traffic flow is, and can than route the traffic where it is most practical. 
 
8.7 Test discussion  
Since the security test discussion may contain information that is considered 
confidential by Ericsson, it is removed from the main report. The results from the 
test are in Apendix 1, which will be made available on request and approval from 
Ericsson or Lars Line. 
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9  Conclusion 
The user of the mobile phone is responsible to look after the phone, but it is 
possible to improve the security related to the terminal. This means that the 
manufactures have to take the IMEI more serious and that the operators make 
the possibility to clone SIM card more difficult. This may result in upgrading the 
software and the hardware not only in the ME and the SIM card, but also the 
operator’s network. It is not a huge problem for the subscribers to buy a new 
mobile phone to get the right configuration on it, this is because the user change 
their mobile phone rapidly. The investment might be more expensive for the 
manufactures and operators.   
  
Because the decryption take place in the SGSN and not in the BTS, and a new A5 
ciphering algorithm has been implemented, the security has been improved. But 
it is possibility to get the identity of the subscribers e.g. by use of false BTS. This 
again can lead to eavesdropping on the user traffic. Subscribers should not trust 
the security of the GPRS network when transferring confidential data more than 
he does using the Internet for the same transfer.   
 
The GPRS backbone is vulnerable for attacks from several points. The fact that it 
is based on well-known technologies, like the SGSNs operating system, only 
increases this risk. The subscriber traffic is only encrypted between the MS and 
SGSN, in other words it will pass through the backbone in clear. The GTP offers 
encryption but this feature is optional and not used by default. In the case of 
protecting the backbone, it is important to continuously monitor the traffic and 
improve the security mechanisms. 
 
It is not possible to exclude that a operator could be a threat for another 
operator, but agreements is a obligation to offer the subscribers each other 
services. BG are used to give protection between the operators.  
 
Because the threats from external network, and the fact that there are more 
people that knows the IP protocol architecture, it is necessary to have strong 
focus of protecting the system with firewalls. 
 
Even if dynamic routing can lead to denial of service attacks, dynamic routing 
also give a better performance when there are many subscribers using the 
network. This is a consideration that the operators should keep in mind when 
choosing static or dynamic routing.   
 
The test we ran indicated that the system we tested could be vulnerable for 
intrusion. Since well exploited safety breaches in a system in all likelihood will be 
included in a system attack, is it important to remove or fix faults as soon this are 
discovered. Information that could be misused was also revealed when looking at 
the packet stream on the backbone. Mechanisms for secure transportation of 
information on the backbone should also strongly be considered used. Since a 
extensive group of people has access to the network, the way access rights are 
handled is crucial.   
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Abbreviations 
AH  Authentication Header 
APN  Access Point Name 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
AuC  Authentication Center 
BG  Border Gateway 
BSC  Base Station Controller  
BSS  Base Station Sub-System 
BTS  Base Transceiver Station 
CIA  Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication 
CGSN  Co-located GPRS Support Node 
CKSN  Ciphering Key Sequence Number 
CS  Circuit Switched 
DNS  Domain Name System 
DoS  Denial of Service 
EIR  Equipment Identity Register 
ESP  Encapsulating Security Payload 
ETSI  European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
FAC  Final Assembly Code 
FW  Firewall 
FR  Frame Relay 
FTP  File Transfer Protocol 
GGSN  Gateway GPRS Support Node 
GMSC  Gateway MSC 
GPRS  General Packet Radio Service 
GSM  Global System for Mobile Communications  
GSN  GPRS Support Node  
GTP  GPRS Transport Protocol 
HLR  Home Location Register 
HPLMN  Home Public Land Mobile Network 
HTTP  Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
IETF  Internet Engineering Task Force 
IMEI  International Mobile Equipment Identity 
IMSI  International Mobile Subscriber Identity  
IP  Internet Protocol  
IPsec  Internet Protocol with security extension   
IPv4  Internet Protocol version 4  
IPv6  Internet Protocol version 6  
ISDN  Integrated Services Digital Network 
ISP  Internet Service Provider 
LAN  Local Area Network 
LEA  Law Enforcement Agency  
LIG  Lawful Interception Gateway 
LLC  Logical Link Control 
MCC  Mobile Country Code 
ME  Mobile Equipment 
MM  Mobility Management 
MNC  Mobile Networks Code 
MS  Mobile Station  
MSC  Mobile (services) Switching Center  
MSIN  Mobile Subscriber Identity Number 
MT  Mobile Termination 
NE Network Element 
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NMSI  National Mobile Station Identification number 
NTP  Network Time Protocol 
OSPF  Open Shortest Path First 
O&M  Operations & Maintenance 
PDN  Packet Data Network 
PDP  Packet Data Protocol 
PIN  Personal Identification Number  
PLMN  Public Land Mobile Network 
PS  Packet Switched 
PSTN  Public-Switched Telephone Network 
PVC  Permanent Virtual Circuit 
QoS  Quality of Service 
RADIUS  Remote Authentication Dial In User Service 
RAI  Routing Area Identity 
RAND  RANDom number 
RPC  Remote Procedure Call 
Sec Lab  Security Laboratory 
SGSN  Serving GPRS Support Node 
SGSNn  Serving GPRS Support Node new 
SGSNo  Serving GPRS Support Node old 
SIM  Subscriber Identity Module 
SMS  Short Message Service 
SNR  Serial NumbeR 
SRES  Signed RESponse 
SS7  Signalling System number 7 
TA  Terminal Adapter 
TAC  Type Approval Code 
TCP  Transmission Control Protocol 
TE  Terminal Equipment 
TLLI  Temporary Logical Link Identity 
TMSI  Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity 
VC  Virtual Circuit 
VLR  Visitor Location Register  
VPLMN  Visited Public Land Mobile Network 
VPN  Virtual Private Network 
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Glossary 
Chipering 
 
Chipering is a method of encrypting text, in which a cryptographic key and an algorithm 
are applied to a data stream to produce chipertext. 
 
Session management 
 
Session management. A user may have several subscribed contexts, any of the 
contexts can be activated or deactivated independently 
 
Buffer Overflow Attacks 
The most common kind of DoS attack is simply to send more traffic to a network 
address than the programmers who planned its data buffers anticipated someone 
might send. The attacker may be aware that the target system has a weakness 
that can be exploited or the attacker may simply try the attack in case it might 
work [22]. 
 
COMP128  
A one-way function that is currently used in most GSM networks for A3 and A8. 
Unfortunately the COMP128 algorithm is broken so that it gives away information 
about its arguments when queried appropriately. This is an undesired and 
unacceptable side effect in a one-way function [23]. 
 
DHCP - Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
DHCP is a communications protocol that lets network administrators manage 
centrally and automate the assignment of IP addresses in an organization's 
network [22]. 
 
Hijacking 
Hijacking is a type of network security attack in which the attacker takes control 
of a communication. In one type of hijacking also known as a man in the middle 
attack, the perpetrator takes control of an established connection while it is in 
progress [22]. 
 
LLC - Logical Link Control 
LLC is a protocol which is responsible to maintain communication channel 
between an individual mobile station and the GPRS core network across the radio 
interface [10]. 
 
PDP  - Packet Data Protocol 
PDP is any protocol which transmits data as discrete units known as packets, e.g., 
IP [1]. 
  
PDP address - Packet Data Protocol address 
PDP address is used to point a particular PDP entity. In GPRS PDP address may 
be dynamic or static. The operator gives dynamic address during PDP context 
activation. Static address is assigned permanently at subscription time [10].  
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PDP context - Packet Data Protocol context 
Each PDP address is described by an individual Packet Data Protocol context in 
the MS, SGSN, and GGSN. Every PDP context exists independently in the states 
active or inactive. The PDP context must be active for data transmission using 
that PDP address [10].  
 
RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service 
RADIUS is a client or server protocol and software that enables remote access 
servers to communicate with a central server to authenticate dial-in users and 
authorize their access to the requested system or service. RADIUS allows a 
company to maintain user profiles in a central database that all remote servers 
can share. It provides better security, allowing a company to set up a policy that 
can be applied at a single administered network point [22].  
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Appendix A ..............................................  Confidential     
Since the security test may contain information that is considered confidential by 
Ericsson, it is removed from the main report. The results from the test are in 
Apendix 1, which will be made available on request and approval from Ericsson or 
Lars Line.
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Appendix B 
Rits Information Security Solutions Ltd. 
 
ISS Internet Scanner 
 
ISS's Internet Scanner is the network security industry's preferred solution for 
network vulnerability analysis and decision support. Internet Scanner focuses on 
the single most important aspect of organisational network risk management – 
identifying and addressing technical vulnerabilities. Internet Scanner performs 
scheduled and selective probes of your network's communication services, 
operating systems, key applications, and routers in search of those vulnerabilities 
most often used by unscrupulous threats to probe, investigate, and attack your 
network. Internet Scanner then analyses your vulnerability conditions and 
provides a series of corrective action, trends analysis, conditional, and 
configuration reports and data sets [31]. 
 
 
ISS System Scanner 
 
System Scanner provides host-based security assessment analysing security 
weaknesses not visible to network scanning. While the Internet Scanner 
determines vulnerabilities by scanning devices at the network level, System 
Scanner detects vulnerabilities internally on the system level through an System 
Scanner agent resident on network devices [32].  
 
System Scanner agents are the software components that are installed on the 
computer that you want to scan. You usually control these agents using the 
System Scanner console’s graphical user interface. A single console can manage 
large numbers of agents throughout an enterprise [33]. 
 
These System Scanner agents allow a security policy to be implemented, 
managed and controlled across an enterprise from a central point. Each security 
risk is prioritised by System Scanner based on its relative severity. Once a system 
has been secured, System Scanner locks down that system's configuration with a 
digital fingerprint, making it easier to detect unauthorised tampering. System 
Scanner agents are available for Windows NT and many popular UNIX platforms. 
 
